Will you give all that a child asks?
Most probably not. You know what is good for the child and what is harmful; what is needed and what is desired.
There is an inner child in each one. Take care of your inner child and live life fully.
Broken thought!
The Summary of the article: “Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers” (by Anthony F. Beavers)
Down the philosophical history till today, there is a question that is lingering: “What is the source of the moral ‘ought’?” Let us examine three answers: Kant believes that it begins from reason, Utilitarianism propagates human desire for pleasure as the source and Thomas Aquinas traced it back to the will of God. Basically, our concept of good and evil will depend on this answer. For Levinas, ethics is, first and foremost, born on the concrete level of person to person contact. Therefore, it is the voice of the Other, who sanctions all our moral obligation. Thus, he is of the opinion that ethics come before reason.
Ethics occurs always in relation to the other persons. The root of Levinas’ concern is to establish the source of contact between persons or the source of interpersonal meaning, and in finding this meaning, Levinas finds the ethical. Ethics in a way shows that the Other is important: Kant’s Categorical Imperative indicates that the Other be treated as an end, Mill’s “principle of utility” implies the greatest happiness for greatest number, and St. Thomas says that harm should not be given to the Other.
It is still relevant to pursue the source of contact between persons, because the Other exists concretely and not as ideas. Levinas comes directly out of the tradition established by Descartes, Kant and Husserl. They give importance to consciousness and ideas. But these do not refer to independently existing persons, while ethics refers to real human beings who exist apart from one’s interpretations. To relate with the Other as an idea, means to deny the autonomy of the Other. For Levinas, this is a violence “totalization.” Totalization is a denial of the Other’s difference and the refusal to accept the otherness of the Other. If ethics presupposes the real Other then such tolalization will, in itself, be unethical.
It is obvious that the contact with the Other cannot be established through ideas. So, Levinas turns to sensibility to find the real Other. Sensibility precedes thought, it is passive and characterized primarily by enjoyment. In the encounter with the other Levinas, unlike Heidegger who looks at the things as tools and implements, views others as nourishments. The process of nourishment consists of enjoyment, wherein the other become the means of my satisfaction and part of me. So, enjoyment is the quenching of the memory of the thirst. It is clear that sensibility reaches further out into the domain of the extra-mental.
Having established subjectivity on the level of sensibility, Levinas points out that the Other cannot be met in the consciousness but on the concrete ground. Secondly, he also establishes that human subject is, first and foremost passive. The ethical moment, is found, for Levinas, on the level of sensibility when the egoist self comes across something that it wants to enjoy, something that it wants to make a part of itself, but cannot. That which the self wants to enjoy but cannot is the other person. The Other resists consumption. The Other is transcendent, beyond the categories of one’s thought. The epiphany of the face of the Other speaks thus: “I am not yours to be enjoyed: I am absolutely Other.” In other words, “Thou shalt not kill.”
The Other comes in surprise or in human rupture that one is caught off guard. It is not mere the perception of the other but more about the presence of the Other. To understand the ethical responsibility in Levinas, the concept of proximity and substitution are important. Proximity means the interpersonal contact. This implies responsibility for the Other. The very meaning of being a social subject is to be for-the-other. So, Levinas writes, “Subjectivity is being a hostage,” which means the Other is dominant and never reducible to other. Substitution means standing in the place of the Other. It arises from the self as held hostage by the Other. It is the means by which one responds to the Other before he or she knows. It is through substitution that one is not ‘another,’ but a different individual. It is the conversion of one’s being as a subjection by the Other into a subjection for the Other.
The notion of “responsibility” is important for Levinas. Responsibility means that in being a subject I am already in the grip of the Other. This paves a way to pass from an encounter with the real Other into ethics. Levinas writes: “I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and fundamental mode of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility. Thus, responsibility is the source of the moral “ought.” So, when we say responsibility is foundational for ethics and interpersonal relations we mean that the meaning of the Otherness of the Other is given in responsibility, and not in my interpretation of the Other. Therefore, the meaning of the Other is “the one to whom I am responsible.” Now, we come to the conclusion that the contact with the real Other becomes the source of the moral “ought.”
By Sebastian Kamsuan Guide: Fr. Felix sdb
10 days with Emmanuel Levinas
-“Ethics precedes ontology”
-A philosophy that made ethical responsibility for the Other (good for human dignity, human sacredness and social discriminations).
1-Totality (the “Same”)
"As a pastor but above all a brother" to the inmates of the Philadelphia prisoners.
Totality refers to the narcissism of the knowing ‘I’ and it’s compulsive need to possess the Other and reduce it to a copy of itself. Levinas claims that Western Philosophy, with its Greek categories favoring universalism, has consistently practised a suppression of the Other. The fact is, “the Other is not a new edition of myself.” He enjoys a separate existence, independent of me.
2-Infinity (The “OTHER”)
Infinity refers to alterity and its radical otherness, as different from the Same. Levinas’ claim is that the Other is not knowable. Further, the experience of fecundity, death and time speak of alterity. Fecundity speaks of the child who is similar and yet distinct, from the parent. Death catches us by surprise; it does not fit into the willed project of man. Time is not a simple experience of duration, but a dynamism which leads us to a relationship with unattainable alterity. Levinas challenges us to respectfully listen to the voice of the Other.
The terms “Said” and “Saying” speak further about the distinction between Totality and Infinity. Whereas the “Said” refers to thematization and closed-ness, “Saying” refers to openness towards the alterity of the Other. “Saying” is much more than the “Said,” inasmuch as language is above all the fact of being addressed, of being acknowledge as a person, in the first place.
3-The Asymmetrical Relation
As different form a symmetrical relation (as seen in Buber’s ‘I-Thou,’) wherein the two parties involved stand on common ground, sharing equal terms, Levinas proposes the model of the asymmetrical relation which speaks of a subject who is at the service of the Other, and who feels ethically responsible for the Other. The face of teh Other commands this non-reciprocal responsibility.
The face expresses both, vulnerability and mastery. Confronted with mortality as it is, it expresses vulnerability. In approaching the self as teacher, it expresses mastery. The Other, as appeal and not as demand, commands the attention of the self from on high. The ethical relation is more about conscience, rather than consciousness.
4-The Levinasian subject
Levinas speaks of an ethical ‘I’, a vulnerable, fragile self. It speaks of a sub-jectiveness in relation to the Other. Subjectivity, he claims, is in-vested by the Other; it is not self-invested. The self is possible only in its calling out by ‘the Other.”
5-The Asymmetrical relation and Justice
Our world consists of more than just me and my neighbour. The presence of the Third party calls for the creation of institutional laws and socio-political structures. Thus, for the sake of justice in general, consciousness and reason are once again brought into play in a necessary way. Justice necessitates a certain amount of universality, in the name of objectivity. What is notable is that Levinas insists that it is ethics that prompts justice, not the other way around. The socio-political order is ultimately founded on an ethical responsibility towards the Other.
Scope: personal change of attitude of oneself and the Other and any sort of social discriminations.
-Elemental Evil
It is based on ideas, blood and heredity. Eg. Hitlerism.
-Tyranny of the universal
Universality of truth gives way to the ideal of expansion. Levinas argues strongly for respecting the singularity and distinctness of the Other. This has rich implications in a context wherein victims of social discrimination have been totalized into controllable entities by dominant groups in society boasting of the so-called purity of blood, race and caste.
-The Other pointed out as Enemy
Since the Other threatens the unity of “the Same,” he is pointed out as the enemy and his annihilation is sought by the keepers of the system.
-Reification, or Objectification of the Other
The Other is made out to be a mere thing, a mask, without transcendence or mystery.
(One calls the Other: a worker, a mahar...)
-Work and Alienation
The Other, as worker, does not have total control over the work of his own hands. It can be usurped any time by another.
-Ethical Resistance of the Face
The Other remains transcendent in the face of death and murder, exceeding the powers of the murderer infinitely. Paradoxically, such a resistance of what has no resistance is what may be called ethical resistance. The Other’s force is not so much physical, as moral.
-In Pluralism’s Favor
Levinas makes a strong case for plurality and multiplicity. The distinctness and unicity of the I consists in existing without having a genus. The distinctness of the human person thus favors pluralism and multiplicity. Levinas alleges that relating only within the circle of totality and the same amount to incest. Again, his challenge is to reach out to the first one that comes along. So long as I reach out to my neighbour in recognition (re-cognition) of him, I am already practicing discrimination. Plurality, then, is an antidote to racism and casteism.
-Good beyond Being
Levinas does not absolve anyone from his responsibility to his neighbour, not even the exploited one. He even recommends taking responsibility for the actions of the exploiter, thus preserving the asymmetrical character. Violence cannot be cured by violence.
-Justice Relations
Ethics is the foundation of justice and there is violence in justice. Comparing the incomparable for justice’s sake implies a violence. Justice, then, is a necessary evil. Furthermore, justice always desires a better justice. Levinas also sees a relationship between justice and religion. He said, “it is not a gift of the heart, but of the bread from one’s mouth, of one’s own mouthful of bread.”
Levinas’ understanding of metaphysics is creditable. Metaphysics, he explains, is the relation with the Other, and is accomplished in service and hospitality. So also, it is not reason that creates the relation between me and the Other, but it is the Other’s teaching me that create reason. Thus we see that it is the ethical relation with the other that decides the character of metaphysics and reason. Levinas calls for a Permanent revolution against the injustice in the system for the betterment of the individuals. One thing is clear that Levinas is inviting us to reach out in solidarity with the ones suffering injustice and unfair treatment.
Face:
Enigma= mysterious, ‘evasion’, ‘rupture’, ‘interruption’ or ‘invasion,’ epiphany
The different connotations of the word Face
The French word visage, like the German Gesicht, refers to seeing and being seen.
The Hebrew expression panim, not unlike the German Angesicht or Antlitz, emphasizes the face facing us or our mutual facing. The Russian term lico means face, cheek, but also person, similar to the Greek prosoˆpon which literally refers to the act of ‘looking at’ and
which stands not only for the face, but also for masks and roles, rendered in Latin by persona.
The speaking face: the call of the other
-everyone is reduced to what he or she achieves in an
anonymous way: life and workare nothing more than masks
-the interhuman asymmetry is a double-sided one.
-the other’s otherness eludes every qualification we may apply
